Bryan S. Turner

The erosion of citizenship

ABSTRACT

The Marshallian paradigm of social citizenship has been eroded because the social and economic conditions that supported postwar British welfare consensus have been transformed by economic and technological change. This article argues that effective entitlement was based on participation in work, war and reproduction, resulting in three types of social identity: worker-citizens, warrior-citizens and parent-citizens. The casualization of labour and the technological development of war have eroded work and war as routes to active citizenship. Social participation through reproduction remains important, despite massive changes to marriage and family as institutions. In fact the growth of new reproductive technologies have reinforced the normative dominance of marriage as a social relation. These rights of reproduction are described as 'reproductive citizenship'. The article also considers the role of voluntary associations in Third-Way strategies as sources of social cohesion in societies where social capital is in decline, and argues that the voluntary sector is increasingly driven by an economic logic of accumulation. With the erosion of national citizenship, Marshall's three forms of rights (legal, political and social) have been augmented by rights that are global, namely environmental, aboriginal and cultural rights. These are driven by global concerns about the relationship between environment, community and body such that the quest for social security has been replaced by concerns for ontological security.

KEYWORDS: Citizenship; globalization; voluntary associations; war; work; reproduction

MARSHALL AND THE THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP

The Marshallian theory of citizenship has been extensively discussed for half a century. It will suffice here merely to summarize its principal components and to outline the major criticisms raised against it (Turner 1986). Marshall (1950) divided citizenship into three parts. The civil component was necessary for the achievement of individual freedoms and included

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such elements as freedom of speech, the right to own property and the right to justice. The political element was constituted by the rights to participate in the exercise of political power, in particular the rights to free elections and a secret ballot. Finally, Marshall defined the social component as the right to 'a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being' (Marshall 1950{1964}: 69). These three components had evolved from the seventeenth to the twentieth century and had become established through a process of institutional differentiation by which special agencies had evolved to express these rights. Alongside these three components, there existed a set of institutions that gave these rights social expression, namely the courts of justice, parliament and councils of local government, and the educational system and the social services.

The importance of Marshall's contribution is the claim that citizenship modifies the negative impact of the capitalist market by a redistribution of resources on the basis of rights, and as a result there is a permanent tension between the principles of equality that underpin democracy and the *de facto* inequalities of wealth and income that characterize the capitalist market place. Within hyphenated society, there is a dynamic and contradictory relationship between capitalism and citizenship, or in more abstract terms between scarcity and solidarity. In the postwar period, citizenship in Britain came to institutionalize the ideals and aspirations of peacetime reconstruction, which was in turn an embodiment of social Keynesianism. In this sense, citizenship is a status position that mitigates the negative effects of economic class within capitalist society. One paradox of citizenship as a status is that differences in status entitlement can be as much a cause of status inequality as a mitigation of class inequality. Status entitlement in a bureaucratic welfare system becomes the occasion for status competition over scarce resources (Lockwood 1996; Runciman 1996; Turner 1989). Marshall recognized this issue in his discussion of the paradoxical relationship between equality of opportunity and equality of condition in his discussion of educational attainments and social mobility. The process of social mobility on the basis of educational certification was intended to remove hereditary privilege, but in practice meant the 'right to display and develop differences' (Marshall 1950{1964}: 94}. Citizenship as a principle of social membership must at the same time function through social conflicts over entitlements as a criterion of social exclusion.

Marshall's paradigm has come under attack from variety of sources – liberal, Marxist and conservative (Beiner 1995). First, the theory failed to provide an effective analysis of the causal mechanisms that produced an expansion of citizenship. The most obvious candidate to explain the growth of social rights in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the impact of working-class conflicts over economic rights relating to employment, sickness benefit and retirement (Montgomery 1993; Parker 1998). In this respect, there have been important differences between the American and British debates. Whereas in Britain, the main factor behind the

growth of social rights has been class inequality in relation to basic resources such as housing, education and social security, the American citizenship debate has been largely inspired by the issues of migration, access and social mobility. The American experience of citizenship has been about the success or failure to implement civic ideals in a context of racial division and conflict (Smith 1997). The other major causal feature in the development of citizenship in both America and Britain has been the unintended consequence of modern warfare. The idea of a comprehensive health system gained widespread acceptance during the war years and Attlee's Labour Government brought in a national health service that offered free treatment to all citizens. The welfare state in Britain after the Second World War and the civil rights movement in America after the Vietnam War were both responses to the mobilization of society and to its self-critical reflection.We might call this cause the 'Titmuss-effect'. In his *Income Distribution and Social Change*, Richard Titmuss (1962: 188) argued that war has been an essential stimulus to national self criticism and social change.

The second criticism is that Marshall treated citizenship as a uniform concept and did not attempt to differentiate types of citizenship, or to suggest a comparative study of different forms of citizenship in terms of distinct historical trajectories. It appears to be relatively obvious that citizenship has assumed very different forms in Europe in relation to different patterns of capitalist development. Marshall's account makes no distinction between active and passive citizenship (Turner 1990). What are the historical and social conditions that promote effective and active patterns of social participation rather than merely passive membership? In the past, revolutionary struggles and the destructive consequences of warfare produced active involvement, but, as Titmuss recognized, we may need to devise new means of national critical inquiry and citizenship formation in a period when the possibility of nuclear and biological warfare have removed the conditions that made possible the satisfaction of the demands of returning servicemen.

Thirdly, Marshall assumed a heterogeneous society in which regional, cultural and ethnic divisions were not important when compared to social class divisions. Marshall worked in a political context where the unity of the UK was not an issue and the cultural and constitutional problem of 'Englishness' within the devolution of government in modern Britain was hardly imaginable in Marshall's time. The principal weakness of Marshall was the absence of any understanding of ethnic and racial divisions in relation to national citizenship (Crowley 1998).

Finally, Marshall's theory was primarily a theory of entitlement, but had little to say about duties and obligations. As such the theory envisaged a passive citizenry in which the state protected the individual from the uncertainty of the market through a system of universal rights. Political economists have criticized Marshallian citizenship as liberal reformism that offered formal rights rather than substantive benefits. Critics have claimed that

citizenship is simply a 'ruling-class strategy' to pacify the working class through the promise rather than the enactment of citizenship (Mann 1987). How do citizenship rights become effective forms of entitlement? My argument is that citizenship as a status position is not in itself sufficient to guarantee an effective entitlement; effective citizenship has depended on three foundations or routes of entitlement: work, war and reproduction.

THREE ROUTES OF EFFECTIVE ENTITLEMENT

Rather than define citizenship within a static framework of rights and obligations, it is valuable to conceptual citizenship as process (Turner 1997). Citizenship is both an inclusionary process involving some re-allocation of resources and an exclusionary process of building identities on the basis of a common or imagined solidarity. Citizenship entitlement provides criteria for the allocation of scarce resources and at the same time creates strong identities that are not only juridical, but typically involve assumptions about ethnicity, religion and sexuality (Isin and Wood 1999). Nineteenth-century national citizenship was constituted around racial divisions, because it excluded outsiders from access to resources on the basis of an (ascribed) ethnic or national identity. Because citizenship is a set of processes for the allocation of entitlements, obligations and immunities within a political community, these entitlements are themselves based a number of principles, that describe and evaluate the specific contributions that individuals have made to society, for example through war service, or reproduction, or work.

In historical terms, social citizenship has been closely associated with the involvement of individuals (typically men) in the formal labour market. Work was fundamental to the conception of citizenship in the British welfare state (Beveridge 1944 and 1948). Individuals could achieve effective entitlements through the production of goods and services, namely through gainful employment which was essential for the provision of adequate pensions and superannuation. These entitlements also typically included work care, insurance cover, retirement benefits and health care. Citizenship for male workers characteristically evolved out of class conflicts over conditions of employment, remuneration and retirement. In Britain, class conflict was institutionalized through reformist trade unionism and through various compromises (typically referred to as a form of social contract) between government, employers and workers. The idea that the citizen has a basic duty of work is fundamental to civic society.

Secondly, service to the state through warfare generates a range of entitlements for the soldier-citizen. Wartime service typically leads to special pension rights, health provisions, housing and education for returning service men and their families. War service has been important, as we have seen, in the development of the evolution of social security entitlements

(Titmuss 1963). Thirdly, people achieve entitlements through the formation of households and families that become the mechanisms for the reproduction of society through the birth, maintenance and socialization of children. These services increasingly include care for the ageing and elderly as generational obligations continue to be satisfied through the private sphere (Finch 1989). These services to the state through the family provide entitlements to both men and women as parents, that is as reproducers of the nation. These familial entitlements become the basis of family security systems, various forms of support for mothers, and health and educational provision for children. Although the sexual activity of adults in wedlock is regarded in law as a private activity, the state and church have clearly taken a profound interest in the conditions for and consequences of lawful (and more particularly unlawful) sexual activity. Heterosexual reproduction has been a principal feature of the regulatory activity of the modern state. I have long been a critic of Marxist theories of ideology that claim capitalism requires a 'dominant ideology' in order to satisfy its economic conditions of existence (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1980). However, it is evident that the values and norms of a household constituted by a married heterosexual couple provides the dominant ideal of British social life, despite the fact that four in ten live births in 1998 occurred outside marriage and that for the majority of one family households 30 per cent had no children (Matheson and Summerfield 2000). In fact, the moral force of the idea of marriage and domesticity is so compulsive in contemporary society that for example in the state of Vermont a bill has received approval that would enable gay couples to form 'civil unions', entitling them to about three hundred rights and benefits currently available under state law to married heterosexual couples.

These conditions of effective entitlement also established a pattern of active participation in society, that in turn contributed to civil society through what is known technically as 'social capital' (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000). Active citizenship supported work-related associations (such as working men's clubs, trade union organizations and guilds, and political organizations such as the traditional Labour Party). These associations correspond to what Durkheim called 'intermediary associations' (Durkheim 1992), that is forms of association that mediate between the state and the individual, and provide moral regulation of society (Turner 1999). In British social theory, these community associations – chapels, gardening clubs, women's meetings and ethnic associations – have been recognized as an essential aspect of communal cohesiveness (Hoggart 1958; Williams 1958). While in general mass warfare in the twentieth century has been destructive of traditional society, one unintended consequence of these conflicts was to produce a multitude of (male) associations that provided support and services to ex-soldiers. Ceremonials of male solidarity (ANZAC parades and other rituals of remembrance) kept alive the comradeship of war, and in Britain, the Dunkirk-spirit continued to be a norm of civilian service and sacrifice. Finally, parenthood has traditional

provided solidaristic linkages to the wider community through women's groups, childcare associations, school-related groups, neighbourhood groups, and church-based groups such as the Mother's Union). The growth of postwar active citizenship was also associated with activities that contributed to social solidarity.

This pattern of citizenship has been eroded because the three foundations of effective entitlement have been transformed by economic, military and social changes. It may sound perverse to suggest that the decline of economic participation has brought about an erosion of citizenship in the current British context where participation in the labour force has been rising continuously since the early 1990s. Increasing economic activity is of course especially important for women; between 1971 and 1999, economically active women increased from 56 to 72 per cent. However, high levels of economic participation mask a real change in the nature of the economy and obscures a transition from old to new welfare regimes. The new economic regime is based on monetary stability, fiscal control and a reduction in government regulation of the economy. In this new economic environment, one version of the Third-Way strategy involves, not protecting individuals from the uncertainties of the market that had dominated welfare strategies between 1930 and 1970, but helping people to participate successfully in the market through education (life-long learning schemes), flexible employment (family-friendly employment strategies) and tax incentives (Myles and Quadagno 2000). However, while increasing rates of economic activity has been a positive aspect of economic liberalization, much of this increase in economic participation has involved the casualization of the labour force. The number of men in part-time employment doubled between 1984 and 1999. Radical changes in the labour market (job sharing, casualization, flexibility, downsizing, and new management strategies) have disrupted work as a career. While for employers functional and numerical flexibility has broken down rigidities in the work place, these strategies have compromised job security (Abercrombie and Warde 2000: 81). These changes in work and career structures constitute a significant 'corrosion of character' (Sennett 1998). With the obsolescence of the social relevance of the concept of career (even among the professional classes), there is also an erosion of commitment to the company. Workers can no longer depend on a stable life course or life cycle. In addition, there has been a major decline in trade-union membership and work in a life-long career no longer so clearly defines personal identity. Union density (or the proportion of people eligible for membership who actually join) has declined steadily since 1979, and by 1996 union membership was lower than at any time since the end of the Second World War. Class-based identities are disappearing along with class-based communities. In Britain, the miners's strike of 1984–5 represented the collapse of working-class communalism that had been the back-bone of British social solidarity as celebrated in texts such as *Coal is Our Life* (Dennis, Henriques and Slaughter 1962). For sociology, these social changes have

resulted in a decline of the strong theory of social class and specifically a retreat from the romantic or *gemeinschaftlich* version of class (Holton 1996).

Sociological studies of social class suggest that, while levels of unemployment have been falling in association with the long American economic boom of the 1990s, the contemporary class structure has new components – an 'underclass' of the permanently unemployable (typically lone-parent welfare claimants), a declining middle class associated with the decline of middle management, and the 'working poor' whose skill levels do not permit upward mobility. There is some academic consensus that features of the class structure do not encourage active citizenship through economic entitlement, but these changes in the nature of employment are perhaps insignificant when compared to the greying of the population and the social problem of retirement. In 1901, one person in twenty was aged 65; by 1998, it was one in six. Between 1961 and 1996 the number of people aged 85 and over trebled, reaching 1.1 million people. The number of centenarians increased from 300 in 1951 to 5,500 by 1996. It is clear that the stereotype of the elderly as a dependent and passive population in disengagement theory is false, but it is also true that the ageing of the population has important implications for the shape of the working population and for employment as a basis for entitlement. Inter-generational conflict in the struggle over resources is likely to become an important element in social divisions in this century.

In addition to changes in the economic foundations of Marshallian citizenship, the Titmuss-mechanism of war-related claims to entitlement has largely disappeared with the end of mass warfare. The Cold War and nuclear disarmament meant that the traditional role of the citizen-soldier gave way to a new pattern of warfare involving both professional soldiers and mercenaries as the personnel of modern wars. Unlike France, Britain's military defence of its shrinking empire was modest and Macmillan's vision of peaceful social change in Africa set the scene for gradual disengagement. Modern colonial wars were becoming increasingly expensive in the face of nationalist opposition. The end of conscription and progressive decolonization changed the role of militarism in British society. Britain's brief involvement in the Falklands–Malvinas War of 1982 was the exception not the rule. Of course, this argument is largely about British society, but, given the technological character of modern warfare, the experience of western states in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Kosovo suggests that modern wars corrupt and corrode democracies rather than cementing them together. It is not true that the Gulf War was merely a television event (Rojek and Turner 1993), but it is true that the modern media have made it more rather than less difficult for a democracy to conduct large-scale military interventions in which there is a significant risk of casualties. The disruptive effect of Vietnam on American civil society is the classic example, where US media coverage of the Tet Offensive in January 1968 and the depressing collections of 'body bags' did more to undermine the

government's ability to pursue the war effort than actual Vietcong military successes in the countryside. The result is the erosion of the citizen-soldier as a social role, the decline of service men's clubs as part of civil society and the diminution of military ritualism as part of the secular rituals of civil society and the state. In the age of smart bombs and stealth aircraft, involvement of the masses in military activity can no longer fortunately function as a significant feature of citizenship.

REPRODUCTIVE CITIZENSHIP

The third important change in the foundation of citizenship is the transformation of reproduction in relation to social rights. Recent writing in the field of citizenship studies (Richardson 2000; Yuval-Davis 1997; Voet 1998) has underlined the neglect of gender in the analysis of the national development of citizen entitlements and obligations in the nation-state. We need to extend the discussion of citizenship, nationalism and gender by examining the relationship between parenthood and entitlement. I have already indicated that reproducing the next generation of citizens through marriage and household formation is a central means of acquiring comprehensive entitlements of citizenship and fulfilling its corresponding obligations. Contemporary government policies on new reproductive technologies demonstrate the general importance of eugenics for the modern state. Because the majority of western societies in demographic terms enjoy only modest rates of successful reproduction, the state promotes the desirability of fertility and reproductivity as a foundation of social participation. With an ageing population and a declining birth rate, Britain is no exception to this rule. As a consequence, population growth in the UK has been, since the 1980s, increasingly dependent on net migration. The privileged position that is given to heterosexuality is a function of the manner in which public policies seek to normalize reproduction as the desired outcome of marriage. Within a broader context, the Church under the influence of Pauline theology has typically regarded reproduction as the principal justification for marriage.

The liberal regime of modern citizenship privileges parenthood in 'normal' families, rather than heterosexuality as such, as the defining characteristic of the normal citizen and as the basis of social entitlement. Reproduction through heterosexual sexual intercourse has simply been, until recently, the only means to achieve the social, cultural and biological goals of parenthood. The introduction of technologies of artificial human reproduction in the late 1970s served to underline the manner in which reproduction plays a foundational role in citizenship, because they provide the potential for reproduction without heterosexual sexual intercourse. Despite their widespread acceptance as a treatment for infertility, new reproductive technologies remain controversial medical procedures that continue to receive extraordinary attention from the media. Since their

inception in the late 1970s, methods of human artificial reproduction have prompted considerable debate, offering new means of human fertilization and unanticipated options for family formation. The larger issues which the technologies raise explicitly concern mothering, fatherhood and conception, and implicitly the creation of the social self. The forms in which a government responds to this demographic potential reveals the assumptions of the state for families and the presence of eugenics, namely the system of reproductive values prevalent in society. The concept of 'sexual citizenship' which has been promoted by some sociologists in Britain does not adequately describe the relationship between sexuality, reproduction and citizenship. In fact, the state's interest in sexuality and sexual identity is secondary and subordinate to its demographic objective of securing and sustaining the connection between reproduction and citizenship.

The creation of institutions of citizenship in legal, political and social terms was an important feature in the construction of a national framework of membership within the nation-state – a process that dominated domestic politics in Europe and North America through much of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Nelson 1998). The production of an institutional framework of national citizenship required the creation of national identities. Citizenship identities during the rise of the European cities had been local and urban, but with the rise of nationalism they became increasingly connected with strong nationalistic cultures that sought greater domestic coherence and simultaneously organized negative images of outsiders. The national mythologies of a society cement individual biographies and collective biographies of generations with the history of a nation-state and its people. It is for this reason that theories of citizenship typically connect the enhancement of citizenship entitlement through involvement in warfare, especially in defence of the nation.

It does not follow that women are excluded from nation building. On the contrary, they are crucial for family formation and sexual reproduction; these 'domestic arrangements' in turn reproduce political society (Yuval-Davis 1998). However, women's voices in the grand narratives of nationalism tend to be muted and marginalized by a warrior ethos. Epic poetry, tragic romances and national mythologies combine collective emotions and sentiments with the stories of nation building. In 1932, Matthew Arnold (1969) was able to assume in *Culture and Anarchy* the authority of high culture and the role of the intellectual as its defender. He could also assume that a strong national culture required a powerful state to impose its moral leadership at home and abroad. This masculine national culture as the civilizational framework for emerging citizenship was reproduced through the elite institutions of the public schools, the Church of England, the military and the ancient universities. Modern masculine identities were forged and sustained by nationalism, and national identity has been built around and sustained by the institutions of citizenship which are national institutions of exclusionary entitlement. These macro-social processes that have traditionally sustained national citizenship converge on reproduction

within the family as the principal institution that functions as the conduit of individual entitlements.

The nation-state presupposed a continuing pattern of patriarchy and patriotism as the dual legacy of monarchy and state building. The modern matrix of nation, citizenship and masculinity has been changed by the global challenge to national sovereignty, by the transformations of work and warfare in modern societies, and by the transformation of sexuality and parenthood associated with the development of reproductive technology. Despite these fundamental social and political transformations, the foundations of national citizenship and the basis of individual entitlement remain legally and socially connected with reproduction and hence with the family and heterosexuality. A familial ideology of procreation has been a major legitimating support of the contemporary ensemble of entitlements that constitute the social rights of citizenship.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONALISM: A FOURTH WAY TO ENTITLEMENT ?

The erosion of citizenship through the transformations of work, war and parenthood also corrodes the possibilities of participatory or associative democracy. Modern society is no longer constituted by a dense network of associations, clubs, fraternities, chapels and communal associations. The decline of social capital is a major index of the erosion of citizenship (Putnam 1993 and 1995). The late twentieth century has been marked by a major decline in all forms of social participation, at least partly as a consequence of the impact of television on leisure activities. Religious membership, confirmations, baptism and marriages in the mainstream Christian churches have declined considerably since 1970, although there has been an increase in evangelical sects and in non-Christian religions. Membership of political parties and newspaper readership have also declined. Whereas 76 per cent of men and 68 per cent of women claimed to read a newspaper in 1981, newspaper readership had fallen to 60 and 51 per cent respectively by 1998–9.These changes raise questions about the possibilities of participation in contemporary society, and specifically about the level of third-sector institutions such as voluntary associations in providing opportunities for social service and participation. It is generally recognized that individual giving to charities and voluntary associations has steadily declined in the postwar period. The conventional assumption is that participation in the voluntary sector has, like other forms of social involvement declined through the twentieth century, but this pessimistic interpretation appears to under estimate the importance of charities, voluntary associations and philanthropy. For example, *Social Trends* reports that about one quarter of the British population claim to have participated in a voluntary association in the previous year, and of these about half had spent twenty days or more in voluntary activities. While the membership of some associations has fallen, other associations have grown rapidly. For

example, although the membership of the Mothers' Union fell from 308,000 to 177,000 between 1971 and 1990, membership of the National Trust increased from 278,000 to just over two million in the same period (Abercrombie and Warde 2000: 330). Membership of voluntary associations increased from 0.73 memberships per capita in 1959 to 1.12 memberships in 1990. Individual involvement in voluntary associations, clubs and leisure groups is probably more robust than the Putnam thesis about the decline of social capital would suggest. If however we simply count the number of voluntary associations and chart their growth, it is evident that voluntary associations, especially in the welfare sector, have expanded significantly in the last twenty years, and in part this growth can be attributed to the decline of state activity in welfare. The John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project discovered that in the seven countries studied one in every twenty jobs and one in every eight service jobs are accounted for by the voluntary sector. The rolling back of the state appears to have created a social vacuum in which the third sector has expanded to satisfy communal needs.

Recent comparative research on the role of voluntary associations in welfare provision in societies that have adopted innovative market approaches to welfare, illustrate the importance of partnerships between the market, the state and the voluntary sector (Brown, Kenny and Turner 2000). The data from these studies are both comprehensive and complex, but they do begin to provide some useful insight into the functions of the third sector in a democratic but economically competitive environment. The Australian survey provides a national estimate of 93,448 non-government welfare organizations, almost three-quarters of which had a primary focus on health. The Australian sector has enjoyed a growth rate of just under 12 per cent per annum between 1981 and 1994. Although the sector is large and expanding, it is heavily dependent on government sources of funding; for 39 per cent of such organizations, the state government was the principal source of funding, while another 13 per cent were dependent on federal funding. This funding dependency is particularly prevalent in social support agencies dealing with refugees, childcare and neighbourhood houses. Government support was least common among mutual support and aid organizations, self-help groups and rights advocacy groups. This structure of funding relations between government and voluntary associations raises questions about the independence of these associations and their capacity for critical intervention in civil society. In general, this research suggests that we should, for good sociological reasons, be cautious about the optimistic claims of Third-Way strategies to resolve the dilemmas of modern democracies.

For many critics of market-driven social policies (variously described as Thatcherism, Reagonomics and Managerialism), the reduction of state support for welfare was automatically taken to be a measure of the decline of social citizenship, but this argument ignores the fact that many features of the postwar, welfare state were bureaucratic, paternalistic and

exclusionary. For the critics, state bureaucracies were thought to undermine individual freedoms and create psychological dependency. While we should not exaggerate the degree of postwar political consensus as to the role of the state in welfare provision in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War (Sullivan 1992), criticism of the legacy of 'bureaucratic collectivism' became increasingly strident in the 1970s. The state welfare bureaucracy was an obvious target of right-wing criticism in the Thatcher Years, but left-wing and liberal critics of bureaucratic welfare were equally antagonistic towards invasive welfare processes, especially means-tested support. In the period leading up to the election of Mrs Thatcher's Conservative government in 1979, there was a paradoxical agreement between the left and right wings of British politics that the welfare state was in crisis. The solution adopted by the Thatcher and Major governments (1979–1997) was to reduce public expenditure on welfare, privatize national industries and cut personal taxation. The new consensus of the Blair government places greater emphasis on Third-Way strategies, part of which involves a quest for either partnerships between government and third-sector organizations or direct encouragement of the voluntary sector to provide local and community based services. Given dissatisfaction with the negative consequences of the market as a solution to social and political questions, reliance on the voluntary sector is compatible with the search for active citizenship, associative democracy and subsidiarity in service provision. The underlying assumption is that a vibrant democracy is unlikely to flourish without authentic community, but whether or not voluntary associations can provide an effective welfare service is possibly less important than whether they can provide an experience of community involvement that in turn can be a schooling in democracy.

The third sector, and more specifically voluntary associations, can provide opportunities for social participation, for democratic involvement at the local level, and thus for active citizenship. They are essential to the survival of the public sphere, and in terms of service delivery, they can provide welfare programmes that are sensitive to local client needs. This positive view of the voluntary sector and active citizenship is often shared by both politicians and academics (Hirst 1994). Voluntary associations have the potential to be the principal organizing force in society providing public welfare and the primary means of democratic governance. Indeed, if government really is part of the problem, then Hirst's proposal should be all the more attractive since its primary aim is to reduce the scale and scope of the affairs administered by the state. Subsidiarity would be achieved through a process of devolution of state functions, authority and funding to a network of voluntary associations. Such a system would support a process where citizen choice is combined with public welfare and, because voluntary associations have the capacity for a high level of communicative democracy, this devolved political structure would allow for widespread consultation, co-operation, and collaboration. Voluntary associations are characterized by organizational autonomy from the state

and where their internal organizational structures support client involvement, they are better suited to promoting welfare that is targeted to local communities than state bureaucracies. Voluntary associations have four democratic enhancing functions: they provide information to policy makers; they redress political inequalities that exist when politics is materially based; they can act as schools of democracy; they provide alternative governance to markets and public hierarchies that permits society to realize the important benefits of co-operation among citizens (Cohen and Rogers 1995). Non-profit organizations are a crucial condition of political participation; they are more efficient than government provision and can be more sensitive and responsive to the needs of client groups; they are crucial for the reproduction of social capital that underpins effective democratic political systems and strong economies; they provide for a strong civil society that counterweights the tendencies towards domination of the state and market forces.

These broad claims for the democratic functions of the voluntary sector have to be modified to take into account the extreme variation with the sector. We must in any case start with a definition of voluntary associations. The point of this definitional digression is to suggest that large voluntary associations working closely with government may share characteristics with large profit-making corporations. There is considerable criticism of the notion that voluntary associations can be entrepreneurial, democratic and responsive to client interests. Research in Australia and Britain suggests that the interests of associative democracy and social inclusion are probably better served by small community groups on the margins of the social order than by large associations that are like corporations apart from the fact a share of the profits are not distributed to the board of managers (Brown, Kenny and Turner 2000). Despite the extent of the debate about voluntary associations, there has in fact been little agreement about how they might be precisely defined (Giner and Sarasa 1996; Sills 1957).Voluntary associations can be said to have five characteristics: they are organized, private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing and voluntary (Salamon and Anheier 1996: 69).

Sociological analysis of voluntary associations has been concerned to explore their autonomy and independence in relation to both the state and the market. In the British context, the connection between government and voluntary association has been historically very close. On the one hand, the creation of the national health service and welfare state simply transferred existing services from the private to the public sector; on the other hand, the rolling back of the state has simply reversed that process. They are defined as private, because they exist between government and market; they are also civil society organizations. There are some difficulties with this location of the voluntary sector, because in practice their connections with government are very strong. There are a variety of funding arrangements in the UK, indicating the close relationships between government and voluntary organizations, which include direct financial

support and tax concessions (Kendall and Knapp 1996). The national lottery also channels funding into the voluntary sector under the regulation of the government.

There is also considerable ambiguity in the relationship of voluntary associations to the economy. Traditionally voluntary associations were not expected to function like business organizations and their funding came from philanthropy, bequests and other gifts. Although voluntary associations are still either non-profit and not-for-profit organizations, they are increasingly under pressure from marketization and commodification. In order to raise funding, they have to compete for government grants and so there is pressure for these associations to become more professional. They need to hire staff that are highly qualified, not only to run large and complex organizations, but who are knowledgeable about government strategy, costing and managing projects. These developments tend to create a gap between the board of managers and the rank and file. There appears to be an inherent tension in how voluntary associations are organized, because the growth of professional values may conflict with traditional notions of philanthropy. The rise of generic management illustrates a common professionalization of the sector. The functions and composition of the boards of voluntary associations have been critically discussed in the social policy literature, because they are sensitive sites of public debate and concern. It is also assumed that voluntary associations will be self-governing. The pressure to professionalize in order to increase financial resources also therefore creates new problems about responsibility, access and participation. These management issues are somewhat ironic, given the fact that the voluntary sector is regarded as the spearhead of grass-roots democratization. If voluntary associations become large and bureaucratic, they cannot remain sensitive to local or client interests, and they reproduce the worst features of traditional, top-down, welfare bureaucracies.

We can summarize these issues by saying that, especially for large voluntary associations, the voluntary sector is now under the same financial and management pressures that shape the capitalist corporations. In particular, voluntary associations are driven by a logic of resource maximization and enhancement (Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 1998: 35), they are forced to employ and promote managerial rationality (and thus to recruit from a pool of generic management), they are also compelled to professionalize their processes of recruitment and training, and they are dependent on rational and professional systems of fund raising. In Britain and Australia, they are very dependent on their ability to tender successfully for government grants. There is some force to the conventional criticisms of the voluntary sector: it cannot provide a universalistic service, it does not have clear performance criteria, and it may not be cost effective. Worse still, voluntary associations may often function more like social clubs than service agencies, and they may form a social hierarchy of agencies that is a mirror image of the status hierarchy of society as a whole. Some charities and voluntary associations simply serve the 'expressive needs' of the

middle classes and provide social outlets for unpaid work from the middle classes (Pearce 1993). Critical research literature in the 1970s suggested that voluntary associations functioned to restrain wage increases in social services as a result of competition between paid and unpaid workers (Gold 1971). The economic framework within which the voluntary sector operates in the UK is not conducive to sustaining its more idealistic or Tocquevillian objectives of democratization. Voluntary associations that are run by and for local aboriginal communities (in Canada and Australia), or more generally associations that exist to provide a specific service to marginalized social groups (such as HIV-positive gay activists), are able to avoid bureaucratization and co-optation. Perhaps for rather obvious reasons, voluntary associations to provide a social conduit for activist groups and rights advocacy are less dependent on government funding, more closely associated with community needs, less driven by the norms of generic management, and closer to the Tocquevillian model of a participatory democracy.

CONCLUSION: NEW PATTERNS OF CITIZENSHIP

The Marshallian framework has been eroded because economic changes, technological innovation and globalization have transformed the nature of work, war and the social relations of reproduction. The three routes to effective citizenship no longer provide a firm socio-economic framework within which social rights can be enjoyed. Although the voluntary sector provides partial means for restoring and sustaining civil society, this idealism has to be tempered by a recognition that the sector is also shaped by economic conditions of competition and commercialism that may prove to be incompatible with the objectives of associational democracy. By arguing that the Marshallian framework has been eroded, I do not argue that these rights are irrelevant, but rather that the debate and the issues have moved to a different level, and as a result the character of the debate has changed. Marshallian citizenship in modern societies is ‘thin’ rather than ‘thick’, partly because the social capital that underpinned the communal basis of social involvement has been diluted by the passive world of television (Tilly 1995: 8). In Britain in 1998, people over four years of age watched on average twenty-five hours of television per week. Less than 4 per cent of the population had, in the previous twelve months, engaged in any political activities such as election campaigns or helping political parties or movements.

There is therefore considerable evidence to support a pessimistic analysis of the prospects of active citizenship in modern society. An alternative view, that forms the basis of my conclusion, is that, while Marshall’s world has disappeared, a new regime of rights has emerged that reflects these changed social conditions. In brief, the social rights of nation-states are being slowly replaced or, better still, augmented by human rights. First,

these new forms of citizenship are not specifically located within the nation-state, and are typically connected with human rights legislation rather than with civic rights. The communities that supports these rights are global, virtual and thin, rather than local and thick. Secondly, they arise because of social issues related to global changes and pressures, and in this sense are post-national, and finally they are conceptually interconnected, because they are driven by a common problem of modern society, namely the relationship between the human body and the environment (Turner, 1993). The old causal mechanisms of Marshallian citizenship – class conflict and mobilization for warfare – have been replaced by new causal processes that are more closely connected with social movements, status contradictions and identity.

This set of human rights has evolved for two basic reasons. The problems of the global order, such as the global spread of AIDS or the pollution of the environment, cannot be solved by the unilateral action of individual governments, and secondly because the social risks of modern society that are created by new technologies (such as cloning or genetically modified food) do not fit easily into the existing politico-legal framework. Although Marshall's paradigm is now sociologically obsolete, I conclude by identifying three types of post-national citizenship that parallel the three components of citizenship in his original argument.

Global concern for the negative consequences of industrial capitalism on the natural environment has become a dominant issue of contemporary politics. Individual governments have, at various levels of intervention, attempted to protect their national populations from the effects of the industrialization of agricultural production, carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles, contamination from civil nuclear power or oil spillage from shipping disasters. Writing about the development of environmentalism in Britain, Howard Newby (1996) identified four stages in the emergence of 'environmental citizenship'. First, from the 1880s to the turn of the century, there was a concern for preservation as epitomized by the National Trust. Secondly, in the inter-war years there was growing criticism of laissez-faire economics among the middle class and an emphasis on regulation and the provision of amenities. Between the early 1960s and 1970s, environmental concerns were expressed in a third stage through the debate over post-materialism and the limits to growth through organizations such as Friends of the Earth and the Ecology Party. We might note in passing that, while membership of the Mothers' Union slumped between 1971 and 1990, membership of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds increased from 98,000 to 890,000 and for the World Wildlife Fund for Nature, membership expanded from 12,000 to 219,000. Finally, in the late 1990s the British debate, that had been decidedly parochial, was challenged by the universal dimensions of global warming and, with a new emphasis on sustainability, the traditional language of amenity was replaced by a discourse of global catastrophe.

The widespread interest in the concept of 'risk society', that was made

popular in the 1990s by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992), captures the critical dimension of the ecological consciousness as a lack of confidence in expert opinion and lack of trust in government policy. The recent British debate about genetically modified food is a perfect example of green politics in which ecological citizenship is expressed as a right to a safe 'natural' environment. Whereas social rights were often the consequence of class-based activity, contemporary human rights are frequently the result of social or environmental movements that have diverse social memberships. Global and national social movements, rather than social class conflicts, appear to be relatively successful in bringing about the expansion of rights. It has been argued for example that in the case of Taiwan the causal connection between awareness of rights and the growth of participatory democracy is illustrated by the anti-nuclear power movement in the 1980s. Against a background of economic growth and political reform, the movement's leadership sought more than the establishments of liberal rights', they also promoted a new right: the right to a clean environment' (Huag 1999: 313). Whereas Marshallian citizenship rights attempted to protect individuals from the vagaries of the market place, the new regime of global rights attempts to protect humans from the negative consequences of economic growth and technology on their health and safety (Jelin 2000). It would be more precise to say that the human rights legislative framework is to protect future generations from the contemporary consequences of environmental degradation.

While the environmental lobby and the emergence of environmental or ecological citizenship were shaped by a sociological concern over the impact of industrial capitalism on the environment, the second dimension of this debate involved anthropological concern with the impact of capitalism and colonial powers, not only on the environment, but on human communities as such. The notion that unrestrained industrial capitalism had a negative impact on the natural environment was followed by obvious conclusion that the spread of capitalist agriculture had had devastating consequences for pre-modern tribal society. The destruction of 'primitive society' was not simply a consequence of military encounters or the ravages of European disease; it also involved the removal of aborginal society from the land in order to create a global market in beef, sheep and cereals. In the nineteenth century, the spread of capitalist agriculture, the destruction of aboriginal cultures and white migration created the characteristics of the 'white-settler society' from North America to New Zealand. In the twentieth century, these societies have experienced a common pattern of policy making designed to acculturate, to assimilate or to accommodate aboriginal peoples. Neither assimilation nor multiculturalism has produced satisfactory solutions for the social deprivation of aboriginal communities. Aboriginal society has suffered from a lack of effective political leadership, mainly because internal language and cultural divisions have precluded a coherent response to white society. Perhaps the principal historical exception has been the Maori people of New Zealand who have been able, unlike

Australian aboriginals, to unite behind a constitutional framework such as the Treaty of Waitangi. The political problem in essence is whether aboriginal people can or should be treated as citizens of the nation-state, or whether their political aspirations are better served by other legal means and political structures. After some two hundred years of assimilation, it is not self-evident that the Australian aboriginals have achieved even second-class citizenship in terms of health, education and political participation. Assimilation can also have another less desirable dimension, namely assimilation to alcohol, prostitution, tobacco and other drugs. In these circumstances, the social rights of citizenship will need to be augmented by international intervention and human rights legislation. An alternative view, therefore, might be that aboriginals are yet to receive any effective rights or to realize their claims.

It could be assumed that the tensions between aboriginal human rights and general social rights have little or no relevance to the British Isles. This assumption is mistaken, because understanding the relationship between the exploitation of the land and the destruction of aboriginal cultures has given rise to a wider, and possibly more important, debate about cultural rights. Whereas the Marshallian framework had little analytical light to throw on the problem of ethnic identity, the global aboriginal issue has been a spur to more fundamental discussion of questions relating to identity and difference. The third type of citizenship rights is thus concerned with culture. Cultural rights (to language, to a share in the cultural heritage of a community, and to religious identity) have become central to the modern politics of identity, but these cultural rights have neither precise nor necessary connections with membership of the nation-state.

These emerging rights (to a safe environment, to aboriginal culture and land, and to ethnic identity) point to and are underpinned by a generic right, namely a right to ontological security. Human beings are characterized by their vulnerability and by the precarious character of their social and political arrangements (Turner 1993). Where life is nasty, brutish and short, citizenship functions to make this Hobbesian world more secure and civilized, but the irony of globalization is that in many respects our world is becoming more risky and precariousness, because the dangers of modern technology often outweigh its advantages. This generic right of ontological security is closely connected to questions of human embodiment, and thus this right of security is a right to human existence as such. It goes beyond the rights of reproductive citizenship to include the right to be respected. This right to ontological security underpins the other environmental, cultural and identity claims that have been characteristic of modern social movements (Heidegger 1977). Central to this analysis of technology is the vulnerability of human beings and the precariousness of their social world. The argument of this lecture is that our ontological security can only be safeguarded by a new set of values that embrace stewardship of the environment, care for the precariousness of human communities, respect for

cultural differences and a regard for human dignity. In short, we need a set of obligations that correspond to the demand for human rights.

These three post-national citizenship rights (ecological, aboriginal and cultural) are identified here as analogous to Marshall's three stages of national citizenship. These new rights as both conceptually and historically connected by the risks to human embodiment in a global system. Post-national rights of the global environment are connected by human frailty and by the fact that the nation-state cannot adequately respond to the vulnerability of human beings within an ecological system that is profoundly disrupted by modern technology. What is less clear – if we are to continue the parallel with Marshall – is the presence of an institutional structure to which they correspond. Marshallian citizenship rights were matched by the rise of specific institutional structures – the courts of justice, parliamentary institutions, and the welfare state. Environmental rights, aboriginal and cultural rights are all enshrined in some components of the Declaration of Human Rights and more recently in the legal recommendations arising from a variety of UN conferences on the environment, population, and human settlements, but as yet there is no decisive set of governmental arrangements at the global level that enforce or match these rights. The notion that there should be global governance has been canvassed by numerous social scientists, but for global governance to make sense, we would need to spell out how a global political community could exist. The prospects of such a system are not too promising and thus the question that lies beyond the scope of this lecture would need to explore the conditions under which global governance would be both feasible and desirable.

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Bryan S. Turner
Social and Political Sciences
University of Cambridge

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